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THE HISTORICAL INTERTWINING OF MARYLAND'S 
BURGLARY AND LARCENY LAWS OR THE SINGULAR 
ADVENTURE OF THE MISUNDERSTOOD 
INDICTMENT CLERK 
Charles E. Moylan, Jr.t 
Maryland's .burglary and larceny laws historically have been 
intertwined with little attention given to the independent ef-
fects of each. As a result of the overlap of laws, two apparently 
redundant indictments charging first, conspiracy to break a 
dwelling in the daytime with intent to steal goods worth $100 
or more, and second, conspiracy to break a dwelling in the 
daytime with intent to steal goods worth $100 or less are 
reasonable in view of the history of the laws. The author traces 
the independent development of the various burglary and lar-
ceny laws to demonstrate the sources of overlap and ccmfusion 
in their application. 
INTRODUCTION 
Very early in my career on the Court, I sat on a case l wherein the 
adequacy of an indictment was in perilous question. The charge was 
conspiracy. The obj~ct of the conspiracy was a daytime housebreaking. 
The heart of the problem was that the same charge was drawn redun-
dantly in two counts. One charged conspiracy to break a dwelling in the 
daytime with intent to steal goods of the value of $100 or more; the 
other charged conspiracy to break a dwelling in the daytime with intent 
to steal goods of the value of less than $100. Daytime housebreaking, 
of course, requires simply an intent to steal goods of any value.2 The 
distinction between "$100 and upwards," on the one hand, and "less 
than $100," on the other hand, was meaningless. 
The appellants there claimed (disingenuously, we held) to have been 
confused by the alternative language relating to value. They argued that 
the language clearly indicated the object of the conspiracy to have been 
storehouse breaking,3 where the distinction as to value is of critical 
importance, and not daytime housebreaking, w,here it is of no moment. 
The immediate problem was solved4 and justice again triumphed. 
t B.A., 1952, John Hopkins University; J.D., 1955, University of Maryland; State's Attorney 
for Baltimore City, 1964-70; Associate Judge, Maryland Court of Special Appeals, 1970-. 
1. Johnson v. State, 10 Md. App. 652, 272 A.2d 422 (1971). 
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 30(b) (1971). 
3. [d. * 32. 
4. There is an additional thrust to appellants' a·rgument. It is not simply that the 
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The aftertaste, however, lingered. In the course of the defense attor-
ney's effort to exploit confusion, the Assistant Attorney General's 
effort to attribute it to a blunder so transparent as to be incapable of 
confusing, and the judicial effort to patch up artfully the "inartful" 
job, hard words from all quarters were leveled at the absent state's 
attorney and his "benighted" indictment clerk. Why had the dolts 
averred a single offense in two separate counts? What strange obtuse-
ness motivated them to inject a meaningless distinction? What inner 
darkness could ever account for making a daytime housebreaking read 
like a storehouse breaking? The exasperation with the office of the 
State's Attorney was general. 
As a recent alumnus of the beleaguered fraternity, I was instinctively 
defensive for the breed. Though ''neutral and detached" research would 
have to follow, atavistic loyalty at least framed the working hypothesis: 
the distinction was not meaningless; it was simply that we, ignorant 
mayhap of our history, were no longer privy to the meaning. The action 
of the indictment clerk in drawing redundant counts was not incompre-
hensible;. we simply did not comprehend. The presence of the store-
house breaking language in a housebreaking indictment was not sense-
less; it simply made no sense to us. In the last analysis, "[t] he fault, 
dear Brutus, is not in our [indictment clerks and state's attorneys], but 
in ourselves.,,5 
Emotionally, I enlisted immediately in the defense of the buffeted 
and maligned prosecutor's office. The brief, however, has germinated 
for four years. In Holmesian fashion, I set the problem: "Why did the 
indictment clerk draw a housebreaking charge in language which is 
fourth count did not say enough to put them on the right track but that it 
affirmatively misdirected them onto a wrong track. Their thesis is that since the 
language "of the value of $100 or upwards" and "of the value of less than $100" 
appears nowhere in Sec. 30(b) but does appear in Sees. 32 and 342, the storehouse 
breaking offenses, the use of such language can have no conceivable explanation 
except in contemplation of charging an offense under Secs. 32 or 342. That thesis is 
guilty of a non-reading of history. 
Daytime housebreaking (Sec. 30(b» has led a statutory life of its own only since 
1965. (Chap. 345, Acts of 1965). Before that date, daytime housebreaking and 
storehouse breaking with intent jointly occupied Sec. 32. The two offenses had a 
common origin in a series of English statutes enacted throughout the Sixteenth 
and Seventeenth Centuries. The two offenses appeared together in Maryland at 
least as early as 1793. (Chap. 57, Acts of 1793). They were codified together in 1809. 
(Chap. 138, Acts of 1809). The same intent provision served both classes of 
buildings from the common birth until as late as 1943. (Chap. 229, Acts of 1943): 
The present Sec. 342 shared this common destiny since it is an offshoot of the 
greater storehouse breaking with intent offense, branching off from it only in 1933. 
(Chap. 78, Acta of 1933 (Spec. Sess.». 
Unquestionably, from the centuries of sharing a common statutory provision, 
the habit arose of charging the offense with a common indictment form, using only 
a blank space or two to make the limited distinctions that were required. In view of 
a cohabitation so venerable and an estrangement so recent, the fact that each of 
the now distinct offenses has taken on a certain coloration and certain habitual 
.language tracing from the long association between them is not remarkable. 
Johnson v. State, 10 Md. App. 652, 658-59, 272 A.2d 422, 425-26 (1971). 
5. W, SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act I, scene 2, lines 138-39 (6th Arden ed. 1958). 
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today peculiar to the distinct offense of storehouse breaking?" The 
detective, be he Sherlock or Oliver Wendell, must seek his clues in the 
backgrounds of his subjects. I hypothesized that to find the solution, 
one would have to walk again the ancient paths which the model 
indictment form had trod. We must, with Maitland, proceed from the 
known to the unknown. "We shall have to think away distinctions 
which seem to us clear as the sunshine; we must think ourselves back 
into a twilight."6 Lurking somewhere in the mists of time will be an 
explanation for every comma. He who would understand, must go 
back. Then, perhaps, "[tJhis spirit, dumb to us, will speak to him.'" 
INTO THE LABYRINTH 
There are at least eleven distinct offenses in the general areas of 
burglary law and larceny law whose pedigrees are so intertwined; whose 
paths have so often crossed, recrossed and then diverged; and whose 
provisions have at times complemented one another and at other times 
overlapped one another, that our present law makes little sense without 
some understanding of their genealogies. 
The parent offense of common law burglary and six of its progeny 
have a related ancestry and have historically been grouped together in 
our successive criminal codes under the general subtitle of "Burglary: 
Breaking and Entering." The seven offenses now included therein are: 
1. Common Law Burglary.8 The statute does not define burglary 
but does provide the penalty for it. Burglary was a common law 
felony9 brought into Maryland intact by the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights. I 0 It proscribes the breaking and entering of a dwelling house of 
another by night with the intent to commit a felony therein. I I 
6. F. MAITLAND, TOWNSHIP AND BOROUGH (University Press ed. 1964). 
7. W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 1, scene 1, line 171 (2d Kittredge ed. 1967). 
8. Every person convicted of the crime of burglary or accessory thereto before the 
fact shall restore the thing to the owner thereof, or shall pay him the full value 
thereof, and be sentenced to imprisonment in jail or in the Maryland House of 
Correction or in the Maryland Penitentiary for not more than Twenty years. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 29 (1971). 
9. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223-24 [hereinafter cited as BLACKSTONE); 3 E. 
COKE, INSTITUTES *63 [hereinafter cited as COKE). 
10. That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England, 
and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that ~aw, and to the benefit of 
such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen 
hundred and seventy-six; and which, by experience, have been found applicable to 
their local and other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced 
by the Courts of Law or Equity; and also of all Acts of Assembly in force on the first 
day of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven; except such as may have since 
expired, or may be inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution; subject, 
nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of 
this State. And the Inhabitants of Maryland are also entitled to all property 
derived to them from, or under the Charter granted by His Majesty Charles the 
First to Cecilius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore. 
MD. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 5. 
11. Jennings v. State, 8 Md. App. 312, 259 A.2d 543 (1969); Reagan v. State, 4 Md. App. 590, 
244 A.2d 623 (1968). 
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2. Statutory Burglary. 1 2 The offense is precisely that of common 
law burglary in all respects except that the guilty intent need only be 
"to steal, take or carry away the personal goods of another of any value 
therefrom." Literally speaking, this section does not create a new crime 
but simply expands the definition of burglary by expanding its intent 
provision. 1 3 
3. Daytime Housebreaking. 1 4 This offense encompasses the intent 
requirement of both common law burglary and statutory burglary 
"with intent to commit murder or felony therein, or with intent to 
steal, take or carry away the personal goods of another of any value 
therefrom." It parallels burglary in all other respects except that 1) it 
requires only a breaking rather thim a breaking and entering and 2) the 
breaking need only be in the day time 1 5 rather'than the nighttime. 
4. Breaking and Entering a Dwelling. 1 6 This late starter in the 
burglary field, l 7 simply makes it a misdemeanor to break and enter the 
dwelling of another. No felonious or larcenous intent is required. 
5. Storehouse Breaking with Felonious Intent. 1 s This offense histor-
ically paralleled daytime housebreaking except that it protected store-
house and other outhouses rather than dwellings and that it could occur 
in the nighttime as well as the daytime. The penalty provisions and the 
requirement of only a breaking without an entering were the same for 
both offenses. Their intent provisions were historically the same until 
12. Every person, his aiders, abettors and counsellors, who shall break and enter 
any dwelling house in the nighttime with the intent to steal, take or carry away the 
personal goods of another of any value therefrom shall be deemed a felon, and shall 
be guilty of the crime of burglary. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 30(a) (1971). 
13. See Drouin v. State, 222 Md. 271,276-78,160 A.2d85, 87-88 (1960); Melia v. State, 5 Md. 
App. 354, 364 n.10, 247 A.2d 554, 56 n.10 (1968); Reagan v. State, 4 Md. App. 590, 594, 
244 A.2d 623, 625 (1968). 
14. Any person, his aiders, abettors and counsellors, who shall be convicted .of th,e 
crime of breaking a dwelling house in the daytime with intent to commit murder or 
felony therein, or with intent to steal, take or carry away the personal goods of 
another of any value therefrom, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction 
thereof, shall be sentenced to the penitentiary for not more than ten years. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §' 3O(b) (1971). 
15. Proof that the burglary occurred in the daytime or the nighttime will suffice to establish 
this element of the offense. Henry v. State, 20 Md. App. 296, 302-03, 315 A.2d 797, SOl 
(1974); St. Clair v. State, 1 Md. App. 605, 621-22, 232 A.2d 565, 574-75 (1967). 
16. Any person who breaks and enters the dwelling house of another is guilty of a 
misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for 
a term of not more than three (3) years or a fine of not more than five hundred 
dollars ($500.00) or both. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 31A (Supp. 1973). 
17. Law of May 24, 1973, ch. 661, § I, [1974] Laws of Md. 1379. 
18. Every person, his aiders, abettors and counsellors, who shall be convicted of the 
criine of breaking a storehouse, filling station, garage, trailer, cabin, diner, 
warehouse or other outhouse or into a boat in the day or night with an intent to 
commit murder or felony therein, or with the intent to steal, take or carry away the 
personal goods of another of the value of one hundred dollars ($100.00) or more 
therefrom, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction sentenced to the 
penitentiary for not more than ten years. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 32 (1971). 
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they diverged, seemingly by legislative accident, in 1943. I 9 It now 
appears to cover two intent situations: 1) the intent to commit murder 
or felony therein and 2) the intent to steal, take or carry away the 
personal goods of another of the value of one hundred dollars or more 
therefrom. This second intent provision is completely redundant, how-
ever, being subsumed within the felonious intent of the first provision. 
Its predecessor provision had vitality from 1937 to 1943, however. 2 0 
This presently redundant provision has a non-redundant complemen-
tary provision in the larceny family, which proscribes, inter alia, the 
breaking of a storehouse, etc., with intent "to steal any money, goods 
or chattels under the value of one hundred dollars."2 I 
6. Breaking and Stealing Five Dollars or More. 22 This offense covers 
breaking of certain outbuildings and stealing therefrom rather than 
breaking the buildings with intent to steal. Although the litany of 
outbuildings covered is curiously different in this section from that of 
"Storehouse Breaking with Felonious Intent,"2 3 it has been held that 
they are interchangeable and do protect the same structures.2 4 
This offense also has a complementary section in the larceny family 
which proscribes, inter alia, the breaking of storehouses and the stealing 
of less than five dollars therefrom.2 5 Again the litany of outbuildings 
covered in the larceny offense goes off on yet a third roll call of its 
own, but has been restored to equivalency by judicial interpretation.2 6 
7. Burglary with Explosives. 2 7 This somewhat bizarre, ad hoc piece 
of legislation covers common law burglary, daytime housebreaking, and 
storehouse breaking alike. Its object is to proscribe the use of nitro-
glycerin or gunpower to "blow a safe." It provides a penalty of up to 
19. Law of March 29, 1943, ch. 229, § I, (1943) Laws of Md. 241-42. 
20. See Law of May 18, 1937, ch. 141, § 1, (1937) Laws of Md. 262. 
21. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342 (Supp. 1973). 
22. Every person convicted of the crime of breaking into any shop, storeroom, filling 
station, garage, trailer, boat, cabin, diner, tobacco house or warehouse, although 
the same be not contiguous to or used with any mansion house, and stealing from 
thence any money, goods or chattels to the value of five dollars or upwards, or as 
being accessory thereto, shall restore the thing taken to the owner thereof, or shall 
pay him the full value thereof, and shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction 
be sentenced to the penitentiary for not more than ten years. 
[d. § 33 (1971). 
23. The term "storehouse" is used in MD. ANN. CODE art 27, § 32 (1971) whereas MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 33 (1971) uses "storeroom;" § 32 uses "other outhouse" which § 33 
does not; § 33 uses "shop" and "tobacco house" which § ;12 does not; both use "filling 
station, garage, trailer, cabin, diner and warehouse." See notes 18, 22 supra. In 1968, 
"boat" was added to both sections. Law of May 7, 1968, ch. 508, § 1, (1968) Laws of 
Md. 944. 
24. Hardison v. State, 226 Md. 53, 58-59, 172 A.2d 407, 409-10 (1961). 
25. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342 (Supp. 1973). 
26. Hackley v. State, 237 Md. 566, 568-69, 207 A.2d 475, 476-77 (1965). 
See also Poff v. State. 4 Md. App. 186, 188, 241 A.2d 898, 899 (1968). 
27. Any person who breaks and enters, either by day or by night, any building, 
whether inhabited or not, and opens or attempts to open any vault, safe or other 
secure place by the use of nitroglycerine, gunpowder or other explosive, shall be 
deemed guilty of the felony of burglary with explosives. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 34 (1971). 
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forty years in the penitentiary.2 8 As a general turn-of-the-century 
reaction to the more violent of the Jimmy Valentines, thirty-four states 
enacted somewhat similar provisions.29 The Maryland provision be-
came law in 1906.30 
The remaining four of the eleven offenses whose destinies histori-
cally have been intertwined are, generally speaking, of the larceny 
family. These offenses have a related ancestry and traditionally have 
been grouped together in our successive criminal codes under the 
general subtitle of "Larceny." They are: 
8. Grand Larceny. 3 1 This section does not describe the crime but 
merely prescribes the penalty. Larceny of appropriate personalty of any 
value was a common law felony, 3 2 brought into Maryland by Maryland 
Declaration of Rights. 3 3 Grand larceny is still a felony in Maryland and 
applies to the larceny of goods of the value of one hundred dollars or 
more. 
9. Petty Larceny. 3 4 Grand larceny and petty larceny were not at the 
common law separate offenses but simply two aspects of the same 
felony, distinguishable only for penalty purposes.3 5 Actually, Maryland 
statutes have never explicitly recognized the adjectives "grand" and 
"petty" as formal labels to distinguish larceny of a greater amount from 
larceny of a lesser amount.36 As highly serviceable indicators, however, 
the adjectives are universally recognized throughout the common law 
world and, unquestionably, have been en grafted onto our law. Petty 
larceny now applies to the larceny of goods of under the value of one 
hundred dollars. Since 1933,3 7 it has been a misdemeanor and that 
change in its character has had profound reverberations throughout our 
larceny and burglary statutes. 
28. ld. § 35. 
29. Note, Statutory Burglary-The Magic of Four Walls and a Roof; 100 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 
.430 n.l4B (1951). . 
30. Law of April 3, 1906, ch. 476, § 1, [19(6) Laws of Md. 946. 
31. Every person convicted of the crime of larceny to the value of one hundred 
dollars or upwards, or as accessory thereto before the fact shall be deemed guilty of 
a felony, and shall restore the money, goods or things, taken to the owner, or shall 
pay him the full value thereof, and shall be fined not more than one thousand 
dollars or be imprisoned in the penitentiary for not more than fifteen years, or in 
the house of correction or jail for not more than ten years, or be fined and 
imprisoned in the discretion of the court. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 340 (1971). 
32. 4 BLACKSTONE ·229-40; 3 COKE ·106-10. 
33. Gazaille v. State, 2 Md. App. 462, 464, 235 A.2d 306, 307 (1967); see note 8 supra. 
34. If any person shall steal, take or carry away personal goods of another under the 
value of one hundred dollars and being thereof convicted he shall be deemed guilty 
of a misdemeanor, and shall restore the goods and chattels so stolen or pay the full 
value thereof to the owner thereof, and be fined not more than one hundred dollars 
or imprisoned for not more than eighteen months in the house of correction or jail, 
or both fined and imprisoned; provided that all actions or prosecutions hereunder 
shall be commenced within two years after the commision of said offense. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 341(a) (1971). 
35. 4 BLACKSTONE ·229-40; 3 COKE ·106-10. 
36. Melia v. State, 5 Md. App. 354, 360 n.5, 247 A.2d 554, 558 n.5 (1968). 
37. Law of Dec. 15, 1933, ch. 78, § 1, [1933) Laws of Md. Spec. Sess. 249-50. 
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10. Breaking a Storehouse with Intent to Commit Petty Larceny. 3 8 
This provision is a complementary one to "Storehouse Breaking with 
Felonious Intent."3 9 All else is the same except for the measure of the 
larcenous intent. 
11. Breaking a Storehouse and Stealing Less than Five Dollars. 4 0 
This provision complements "Breaking a Storehouse and Stealing Five 
Dollars or More.,,4 I 
DEMARCATION LINE BETWEEN GRAND AND 
PETTY LARCENY 
Because of the continuing dependence of the burglary laws and of 
the larceny laws upon the shifting boundary between grand larceny and 
petty larceny, a mapping of that boundary historically may be helpful. 
From the earliest days of the common law, two kinds of larceny 
were recognized: 1) compound larceny, when committed under circum-
stances of aggravation, e.g., robbery, breaking and stealing; and 2) 
simple larceny, unaccompanied by any aggravating circumstances. Sim-
ple larceny, in tum, was subdivided into grand larceny and petty 
larceny for punishment purposes.4 2 
Larceny, though anciently proceeded against as a crime, was the last 
of the classic felonies to receive royal recognition as a Plea of the 
Crown.43 Because larceny, particularly in its stealthier forms, did not 
38. If any person shall break into any shop, storehouse, tobacco house, warehouse, 
or other building, although the same be not contiguous to or used with any 
mansion house with intent to steal any money, goods or chattels under the value of 
one hundred dollars ... he. his aiders, abettors and counsellors shall be deemed 
guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be tried before any court of competent 
jurisdiction, and being thereof convicted, shall restore the goods and chattels so 
stolen, or pay the full value thereof to the owner thereof, and be further sentenced 
to the penitentiary or house of correction, or to the jail of the county in which the 
offense may have been committed, or of the City of Baltimore, if the offense be 
committed in said city, in the discretion of the court for not more than eighteen 
months. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342 (Supp. 1973). 
39. See note 18 supra. 
40. [I)f any person shall break into any shop, storehouse, tobacco house, warehouse, or 
other building, although the same be not contiguous to or used with any mansion 
house, and steals from thence any money, goods or chattels under the value of five 
dollars, he, his aiders, abettors and counsellors shall be deemed guilty of a mis-
demeanor .... 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342 (Supp. 1973). 
41. See note 22 supra. 
42. 4 BLACKSTONE *229; 1 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN *503 [hereinafter 
cited as HALE). 
43. [T)heft of all kinds is excluded from the list [of the Pleas of the Crown) and given 
to the sheriff. 
G. HALL, Introduction to R. GLANVILLE, TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM 
OF ENGLAND at xxi (1965). 
Since the avowed aim of this present work is to consider only the king's court, it 
is not appropriate to deal here with thefts and other pleas belonging to the sheriff, 
which are heard and determined according to the varying customs of different 
county courts. . 
R. GLANVILLE, TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND 177 (1965). 
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literally involve a breach of the King's peace, at least until that concept 
was significantly liberalized in the 12th century, it was frequently 
proceeded against in the hundred courts and in such seignorial courts as 
enjoyed the franchise of infangthief. 4 4 In 1166, h"owever, Henry II 
induded larceny within the net of the new indictment procedure which 
he introduced in the Assize of Clarendon. Larceny thus took "its place 
among the felonies that are prosecuted by appeal or by indictment."4 5 
Even before its elevation to a Plea of the Crown, larceny was 
subdivided into grand larceny and petty larceny for punishment 
purposes.46 Sir Edward Coke asserts that at the common law, the 
larceny of personal goods "above the value of twelve pence" is grand 
larceny and the larceny of personal goods "under the value of twelve 
pence" is petty larceny. This demarcation line was set formally by the 
Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 15 (1275). He asserts further, 
however, that "this was the ancient law before the Conquest."4 7 Lord 
Coke does not tell us what the situation would be if the value of the 
stolen goods was precisely twelve pence. Sir Matthew Hale, however, 
writing sometime before 1676, tells us that larceny amounts to grand 
larceny when it is "above the value of twelve pence" and petty larceny 
when it is "only of the value of twelve pence or under.'>4 8 Sir William 
Blackstone recognizes the same demarcation point of "above twelve 
pence" vs. "twelve pence or under." He traces the use of that sum as 
the penal escalation point back to the reign of King Athelstan (924-940 
A.D.).49 It may have been mere speculation as to why the figure 
"twelve pence" was arrived at or maintained, but Blackstone does 
observe that during the reign of King Henry I, twelve pence or one 
44. .. [A) medieval franchise of exercising jurisdiction over a thief caught within the limits to 
which the franchise was attached: the right of the lord of a manor to judge a thief taken 
within the seigniory of such lord." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1157 
(1966). 
45. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY Qt" THE ENGLISH LAW 495 (Milsom ed. 1968) 
[hereinafter cited as POLLOCK & MAITLAND). 
46. Since there is theft of a large thing and of a very small thing, account must 
therefore be taken of the property stolen, what and of what kind it is. No christian 
is to be put to death for petty theft or for a trifle, but let him be punished in 
another way, lest ease of pardon furnish others with the occasion for offending and 
lest wrongdoing remain unpunished. Thus if a thief has been convicted. depending 
upon the kind of thing stolen and its value let him either be put to death or abjure 
the realm or the patria, the county, city, borough or viii, or let him be flogged and 
after such flogging released. 
H. BRACTON, THE LAws AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 427-28 (rev. 1968). 
47. 3 COKE *109. 
48. Petit larceny is the felonious stealing of money or goods not above the value of 
twelve-pence without robbery, for altho that by some opinions the value of twelve-
pence make grand larceny ... yet the law is settled, that it must exceed twelve-
pence to make grand larceny. 
The judgment in case of petit larceny is not loss of life, but only to be whipt, or 
some such corporal punishment less than death, and yet it is felony, and upon the 
conviction thereof the offender loseth his goods, for the indictment runs felonice. 
1 HALE *530. 
49. 4 BLACKSTONE *237. 
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shilling was the stated value of "a pasture fed ox ... 5 0 Pollock and 
Maitland also establish the cut-off point at "twelve pence" and trace it 
back both to "an old English and Frankish tradition."5 1 Thus, through 
the Normans into the Carolingian mists. 
Both grand larceny and petty larceny were, by universal acknowledg-. 
ment, integral parts of the same felony of larceny but with significantly 
different penalties. Grand larceny was a capital offense, at least in 
practice, from the ninth year of the reign of Henry I (1109). The earlier 
Saxon laws nominally had punished grand larceny with death, but the 
criminal was permitted to redeem his life by a pecuniary ransom of bot, 
as in the earlier Germanic tradition. It was in the reign of Henry I that 
this right of redemption was taken away. 5 2 From the latter part of the 
12th century, however, acts of simple larceny (as opposed to com-
pound larceny) even when amounting to grand larceny, were increasingly 
subject to benefit of clergy. Thereafter the law, in its ameliorated form, 
frequently punished the thief (provided he could read and write and 
was therefore clerical, of course) simply with forfeiture of all goods, 
whipping, burning in the hand, or transportation for seven years.5 3 The 
luckier individual guilty of mere petty larceny was punished sometimes 
by a whipping, sometimes by a tum in the pillory or tumbrel,s 4 and 
sometimes by loss of an ear.5 5 The distinction between grand and petty 
larceny was thus of real significance to the thief.5 6 
In any event, this "one shilling" distinction,s 7 whether tracing back 
to Athelstan or Charlemagne or simply to Edward I, was already of 
ancient vintage when it arrived in the Maryland palatinate. In 1715, the 
50. [d. at n.(u). 
5!. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 495-96. 
52. [d. at 496. 
53. 1 HALE *517 n.l. 
54. An instrument of punishment; specifically, a cucking stool. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2462 (1966). A cucking stool, in tum, is defined as "a chair in 
which such offenders as scolds, prostitutes, or dishonest tradesmen were formerly 
fastened for punishment by public exposure or ducking in water. [d. at 550. 
55. This ancient penalty for petty larceny anticipated our latter-day subsequent offender 
stautes for: "One ear may be taken for a first, another for a second offense, while the 
gallows awaits those who have no more ears to lose." 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 497-98. 
56. The common law may have brutalised into a single wrong what had, first in local 
jurisdictions and later before justices of the peace, been a more sensitive range. 
Indeed in one respect even the common law did not produce a single wrong. In 
the thirteenth century a distinction becomes visible between grand larceny which 
was punishable by death, and petty larceny which was not. It depended upon a 
money value, twelve pence; and this in itself became an instrument by which some 
flexibility was introduced. The jury, by finding the value of the stolen goods, had a 
power to determine the possible penalty; and their exercise of this power became 
both more conspicuous and more necessary as the value of money fell. They might, 
for example, feel obliged to find that coin was of less than its face value. More 
striking was the contribution of the judges to the same merciful end. They could 
not undervalue things, but they could hold them to be without any value in law; 
and they tried this with jewels and succeeded with bank-notes. These anomalies 
were of course reflected by strange lists in remedial statutes. 
S. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAw 371-72 (1969). 
57. Twelve pence was and is one shilling. 
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"twelve pence" distinction was recognized in Maryland. s 8 That act, 
which recited in its preamble that "many acts of assembly have been 
heretofore made against thieving and stealing, which at this present are 
not sufficient to prevent the commiting of these crimes, or to punish 
them when committed," was an act aimed at the speedy trial of 
such criminals by permitting them to be proceeded against in the 
county courts rather than the provincial court. It provided that "the 
several justices of the county courts of this province" should have 
jurisdiction to hear and dispose of all cases of grand or petty simple 
larceny (robbery, burglary and housebreaking excepted) for the first 
such offense, provided that the value of the stolen goods was not above 
the value of one thousand pounds of tobacco. It further provided that 
the justices could order fourfold restitution as well as the return of the 
stolen goods and could sentence the thief to the pillory or to be 
whipped, not exceeding forty stripes.s 9 It further provided that if a 
man were presented for a second offense "above the value of twelve 
pence," he could only be proceeded against in the provincial court and 
that there he could be sentenced to be branded with a hot iron.60 In 
England the demarcation line between petty larceny and grand larceny 
was never raised above "twelve pence" and remained at that figure until 
the statute 7 & 8 Geo. 4, ch. 29 (1827), abolished all distinction 
between grand and petty larceny. 
In 1809, the General Assembly of Maryland effected the first major 
codification of the criminal law of this State.6 1 Our present article 27 
is erected essentially on the skeleton then established.6 2 Section 6 of 
that law dealt with offenses "affecting private property·" and raised the 
cut-off figure between petty and grand larceny from "above twelve 
pence" to "$5.00 or upwards.,,6 3 Section 6(1) set the maximum 
c· 
penalty for grand larceny at fifteen years in the penitentiary, a sentence 
which is still with us today.64 Section 6(6) established the maximum 
penalty of one year for the stealing of personal goods of "under the 
value of $5.00."6 S 
No legislative changes were made in the Maryland larceny laws until 
1868 when the maximum penalty for petty larceny was raised from one 
year to eighteen months,6 6 which it has remained to this day. 
A special session of the Legislature in 1933 raised the demarcation 
line between petty and grand larceny from "$5.00 or upwards" to 
"$25.00 or upwards.'06 7 It also, most significantly, provided that 
58. Law of April 1715, ch. 26, 1 (1811) Laws of Md. 88. 
59. Id. § 2. 
60. Id. § 4. 
61. Law of Nov. 1809, ch. 138, 3 (1811) Laws of Md. 458. 
62. An excellent discussion of the seminal significance of the law is contained in Brumbaugh, 
A New Criminal Code for Maryland?, 23 MD. L. REv. 1,2-12 (1963). 
63. Law of Nov. 1808, ch. 138, § 6, 3 (1811) Laws of Md. 462. 
64. Id. § 6(1). 
65. Id.· § 6(6). 
66. Law of March 28, 1868, ch. 214, § I, (1868) Laws of Md. 372. 
67. Law of Dec. 15, 1933, ch. 78, § I, (1933) Laws of Md. Spec. Sess. 249. 
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thenceforth petty larceny should be a misdemeanor. Until that time 
petty larceny had been a felony just as fully as grand larceny had been, 
with only a lesser penalty provision distinguishing it.68 In 1952 the 
cut-off figure was raised from "$25.00 or upwards" to its present level 
of "$100.00 or upwards."6 9 
It is now necessary to look at those other crimes on which, over the 
years, the fluctuations of the grand larceny-petty larceny boundary line 
and the changing status of petty larceny have had their effects. 
BURGLARY, COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY 
Common law burglary had settled into its present mold by the 
middle of the 16th century. It evolved out of the pre-Conquest crime of 
hamsecken or hamsocn-housebreaking-dating at least from the time 
of King Canute (1016-1035).70 Its history is dimly seen through such 
ancient commentators as Bracton and Britton, but it seemed to encom· 
pass over the early centuries a number of combinations of 1) robbery 
from the person in a house with or without an actual breach of the 
house; 2) consummated theft from a house where a breach has occurred 
and where the householders are present though they need not be 
awakened or placed in fear; 3) actual theft from a house of a value of 
five shillings or more where an actual breach of the house occurs, no 
householder being present and 4) a breaking of the house with intent to 
steal or commit felony, a householder being present and placed in fear. 
Any of these could occur in the day or the night.' 1 
By the 17th century, burglary had long since been refined into its 
present form.' 2 Hale distinguished burglary as we know it today as 
"that which in a strict and legal acceptation is so called" from these 
other manifestations which he refers to as "hamsacken, housebreaking 
or burglary in a vulgar and improper acceptation.'" 3 Some of these 
68. See Danner v. State, 89 Md. 220, 42 A. 962 (1899). See also Whittington v. State, 173 Md. 
387, 196 A. 314 (1938). 
69. Law of March 28, 1952, ch. 18, § I, [1952) Laws of Md. 228. 
70. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 369 (5th ed. 1942) [hereinafter cited as 
HOLDSWORTH); 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 492-93. 
71. 1 HALE *547-48; 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 493. 
72. T. Plucknett found burglary settling into its modem mold by the end of the fifteenth 
century. Before that it was simply one of the myriad forms of housebreaking or hamsocn: 
In the latest roll, that for Worcester of 1477, with Littleton himself present, cases of 
housebreaking and of close-breaking are described as felonies, with no reference to 
'noctanter' nor to the word 'burgaria' nor to the verb 'burgare'. Only twenty-five 
years later however Marowe discusses burglary as a distinct crime; unlike Coke he 
includes close-breaking as well as house-breaking, but he is already insisting that 
unless it takes place by night it is not a felony. It looks therefore as if the more 
precise definition had shaped itself towards the very end of the fifteenth century; 
not until such a definition was generally accepted would the term 'burgaria' be 
universally used. 
T. PLUCKNETT, Introduction to B. PUTNAM, PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE JUSTICES OF THE 
PEACE IN THE FOURTEENTH AND FIITEENTH CENTURIES: EDWARD III TO RICHARD III at cxvi 
(1938). 
73. 1 HALE *547-48. 
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other forms of housebreaking are of interest, however, for presaging 
such latter-day crimes as 1) daytime housebreaking and 2) breaking and 
stealing. 
As to true burglary, Lord Coke asserts that the nighttime require-
ment had been part of the common law relating thereto at least since 
the fourth year of the reign of Edward VI (1551) when the word 
"noctanter" first appeared in a burglary indictment. He gave the defini-
tion as settled that a burglar was 
a felon that in the night breaketh and entreth into a mansion 
hoU$~ of another, of intent to kill some reasonable creature, or 
to commit some other felony within the same, whether his 
felonious intent be executed or not. 7 4 
In addition to the nighttime requirement, common law burglary is thus 
seen to be different from the other forms of early housebreaking in that· 
no householder need be present where the breaking and entering is 
done with mere felonious intent without the felony being actually con-
summated. 
The common law felony of burglary certainly crossed to Maryland 
with the Ark and the Dove and is referred to in 1715 as one of those 
crimes which cannot be tried in the county courts but only in the 
provincial court. 7 5 From 1809,7 6 to the present,7 7 burglary has never 
been defined or redefined but is simply referred to in the statutory 
provision setting the penalty therefor. 
What is today section 30(a),7 8 and is conveniently referred to as 
statutory burglary, has no ancient lineage and would indeed have been a 
tautology until 1933. Until the Maryland Legislature made petty 
larceny a misdemeanor,7 9 all larcenous intent was, ipso facto, felonious 
intent. With the de-escalation of the character of petty larceny, how-
ever, the question arose as to whether the theretofore solid ediface of 
burglary had been eroded by having had inadvertently chipped away 
from it a substantial chunk of still larcenous, but no longer felonious, 
intent. As early as 1937, the question arose in State v. Wiley. 8 0 Because 
the larcenous intent in the burglary .case before the Court of Appeals on 
that occasion was clearly above the then current grand larceny-petty 
larceny demarcation point of twenty-five dollars, the Court did not 
have to reach the question of whether "in amending section 319 of 
article 27, the Legislature thereby intended to change the definition of 
common law burglary.,,8 1 The Legislature had foreseen the problem, 
however, and in 1937 added a new section 35A to follow immediately 
74. 3 COKE ·63. 
75. Law of April 1715, ch. 26, § 2,1(1811) Laws of Md. 88. 
76. Law of Nov. 1809, ch. 138, § 5, 3 (1811) Laws of Md. 461. 
77. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 29 (1971). 
78. ld .. § 30(a). 
79. Law of Dec. 15, 1933, ch. 78, § 1, (1933) Laws of Md. Spec. Sess. 249-50. 
SO. 173 Md. 119, 194 A. 629 (1937). 
81. ld. at 123, 194 A. at 630. 
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after section 35, which provided the penalty for common law burglary. 
The new section provided: 
Every person, his aiders, abettors and counsellors, who shall 
break and enter any dwelling house in the nighttime with the 
intent to steal, take or carry away the personal goods of another 
of any value therefrom shall be deemed a felon, and shall be 
guilty of the crime of burglary. S 2 
That statutory expansion of the definition of burglary has been carried 
over verbatim into the present section 39(a) and has served to liberate 
the burglary law from any dependence on the vagaries of the larceny 
law.s 3 
DA YTIME HOUSEBREAKING AND THE 
STOREHOUSE BREAKINGS 
The- remaining five crimess 4 to be considered-1) daytime house-
breaking,S 5 2)storehouse breaking with intent to commit grand lar-
ceny,S 6 3) storehouse breaking with intent to commit petty larceny,S 7 
4) breaking and stealing five dollars or mores S and 5) breaking and 
stealing less than five dollarss 9 -are those where the interaction be-
tween burglary law and larceny law is strongest. These crimes are all 
hydrids historically, having some of their origins in the offenses against 
habitation and some of their origins in the offenses against property. 
All five were originally, and two of the five-the breaking and stealing 
offenses-stiIl are, compound larcenies. The compounding factor was 
the involvement of a dwelling house or, by extensions in the 16th and 
17th centuries, other buildings. Let us consider initially the first three 
of these offenses. 
THE BREAKING WITH INTENT OFFENSES 
Housebreaking as an offense was absolutely protean in its manifesta-
tions. A 1715 statute,90 and its prototype in 1681,9 I recognized it by 
82. Law of May 18, 1937, ch. 141, § I, [1937] Laws of Md. 262. 
83. See Drouin v. State, 222 Md. 271, 160 A.2d 85 (1960). For a discussion of what happens 
generally when all larcenous intent is no longer co-extensive with felonious intent, see 
Annot., 113 A.L.R. 1269 (1938). 
84. Neither Breaking and Entering a Dwelling nor Burglary with Explosives require further 
consideration. They are of recent origin and limited utility. They have not been involved 
in the historical interplay with the larceny laws. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 31A (Supp. 
1973); id. § 34 (1971). 
85. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 30(b) (1971). 
86. [d. § 32. . 
87. [d. § 342 (Supp. 1973). 
88. [d. § 33 (1971). 
89. [d. § 342 (Supp. 1973). 
90. Law of April 3, 1715, ch. 26, § 2, 1 [1811] Laws of Md. 88. 
91. Law of Aug. 1681, ch. 3, Laws of Md:, in 7 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 202. 
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name-excepting "robbery, burglary and housebreaking" from those 
crimes which could be tried in the county courts rather than in the 
provincial court-but it did not define what it meant by "house-
breaking." In looking hopefully for the English referent, we find not 
one but half a dozen. 
The restricted definition given to common law burglary by the end 
of the Middle Ages had left great gaps in the fabric of the criminal law. 
It also inspired a century and a half of statutory efforts to fill the gaps. 
In referring to these efforts, in aggregate, Radzinowicz quotes an earlier 
writer as saying: 
Larceny from the house, whether privily committed without 
violence, or openly in the day time, and therefore in neither 
case amounting to burglary, is nevertheless by the laws of 
England made capitally penal in almost every instance; and this 
by a multiplicity of statutes, so complicated in their distinc-
tions, that it would be painful on many accounts to attempt the 
detail of them. It is a melancholy truth, but it may without 
exaggeration be asserted, that, exclusive of those who are ob-
liged by their profession to be conversant in the niceties of the 
law, there are not ten subjects in England, who have any clear 
perception of the several sanguinary restrictions, to which on 
this point they are made liable.9 2 
In much of this Tudor and Stuart legislation, we may discern the 
germs of later Maryland provisions, inexplicable unto themselves alone. 
In 1531, the act of 23 Hen. 8, ch. 1, § 3, made it a nonclergyable 
capital offense to steal goods from any person in his dwelling house by 
day or night, the owner or dweller, his wife, children or servants then 
being in the same house and being put in fear. The statute applied, of 
course, only where the value of the thing stolen was above twelve 
pence. That prerequisite made it grand larceny and therefore capital in 
the first instance; the statute then came into play to deny benefit of 
clergy for this particular form of compound grand larceny whereas 
benefit of clergy was otherwise available for simple grand larceny.9 3 It 
required neither a breaking, as in burglary, nor the element of nighttime 
perpetration. In 1547, the statute was redrafted by 1 Edw. 6, ch. 12, § 
10, to require a breaking but also to permit that only "any person" 
need be present and put in fear, rather than restricting the protection to 
the owner or his family. In earlier and later form, it required an actual 
taking and was thus simply the aggravating factor that raised a clergy-
92. W. EDEN, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW 289 (2d ed. 1771), cited at 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, A 
HISTORY OF ENGUSH CRIMINAL LAW 41 (1948) [hereinafter cited as RADZINOWICZ). 
93. Benefit of clergy, as a commutation of the death penalty, also presaged, in a sense, our 
subsequent offender laws. In England and in early Maryland, it was available for the 
clergyable offenses only for the first such offense. Second offenders went to the gallows. 
Benefit of clergy was not abolished in Maryland until the Law of Nov. 1809, ch. 138, § 11, 
3 (1811] Laws of Md. 468, nor in England until 7 & 8 Geo. 4, ch. 28 (1827). 
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able simple grand larceny to a non-clergyable compound grand lar-
ceny.94 
In 1552, the act of 5 & 6 Edw. 6, ch. 9, § 4, denied benefit of 
clergy95 for compound grand larcenies from a dwelling house, in the 
daytime, under slightly different circumstances. It only required that 
the owner, his wife, children or servants, be present in some part of the 
house, waking or sleeping. It did not require that they be put in fear or 
even be alert to the misdeed. On the other hand, it was restricted to 
owners, families and servants being present (and therefore in jeopardy) 
rather than to "any person." In the same act, section 5 then took the 
criminal law (in terms of serious, i.e. non-clergyable, crime) for the first 
time out of a literal dwelling house and into a lesser structure. It took 
all of the provisions of section 4 and extended them to "any booth or 
tent in any fair or market,,9 6 and also returned to the concept that the 
offense could be in the daytime or the nighttime as to the tents or 
booths.97 
All of the preceding provisions had required that some person in the 
victim· class be present in the dwelling house (or tent or booth) for the 
law of housebreaking to take serious recognition of the offense, i.e., 
make it non-clergyable. In 1597, the act of 39 Ellz., ch. 15, § § 1-2, 
took a giant step toward the present day. The first section recited that 
divers' felonious Persons, understanding that the Penalty of the 
Robbing of Houses in the Daytime (no Person being in the 
House at the Time of the Robbery) is not so penal as to com-
mit or do a Robbery in any House, any Person being therein at 
the Time of the Robbery; which hath and doth embolden divers 
94. 2 E. EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 624-25 (1803) [hereinafter cited as EAST); 1 W. HAWKINS, 
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 206-07 (8th ed. 1824) [hereinafter cited as HAWKINS); 1 RADZINOWICZ 
41-44. 
95. The gap between felony and misdemeanor was much too large, and by using the 
benefit of clergy Parliament was able to make some crimes capital for the first 
offense (non-clergyable) and others only for a second felony (clergyable). Thus a 
rough classification of crimes into more than the two medieval categories became 
possible. This process was carried further by developing the policy of the Act of 
1576, and condemning persons convicted of clergyable larceny to transportation for 
seven years. Thus the survival of clergy greatly modified the harshness of the penal 
law and permitted the growth of a graduated scale of punishment. 
Benefit of clergy was abolished in 1827, but its ghost continued to haunt the law 
until less than a hundred years ago. 
T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 441 (5th ed. 1956) [hereinafter 
cited as PLUCKNETT). 
96. Blackstone spoke disparagingly of tents or booths, observing that: 
Neither can burglary be committed in a tent or booth erected in a market or fair, 
though the owner may lodge therein: for the law regards thus highly nothing but 
permanent edifices; a house, or church, the wall or gate of a town; and though it be 
the choice of the owner to lodge in so fragile a tenement; but his lodging there no 
more makes it burglary to break it open, than it would be to uncover a tilted 
waggon in the same circumstances. 
4 BLACKSTONE *226. Blackstone was speaking, however, only in terms of common law 
burglary. 
97. 2 EAST 626-27; 1 HAWKINS 207-08; 1 RADZINOWICZ 44-45. 
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lewd Persons to watch their Opportunity ... to commit ... 
many heinous Robberies, in breaking and entering divers hon-
est Persons Houses, and especially of the poorer Sort of People, 
who ... are not able to keep any Servant, or otherwise to leave 
any Body to look to their House .... 9 8 
43 
The second section then went on to deny benefit of clergy for any 
thefts perpetrated, in the daytime, in any dwelling house or any 
outhouse, no person being therein, but hedged a bit by requiring that 
the theft be of the value of five shillings or above. 9 9 A breaking was, of 
course, still required, but for the first time no victim need be at home. 
Unoccupied houses were protected during the day. For the first time 
also, the word "outhouse" appeared with its implication for the future 
section 32 of the Maryland law' 00 although in 39 Eliz., ch. 15 (1597), 
"outhouse" was clearly still appurtenant to the dwelling house, whereas 
by the time the word reached Maryland it had severed that relationship .. 
For the first time also, the figure of five shillings appeared as the critical 
aggravating factor for the compound larceny of breaking and stealing, 
with its clear implication for the future sections 33 and 342.' 0' The 
critical aggravating point for those sections is now five dollars; in their 
predecessor sections, it was one dollar prior to 1952;' 02 in the prede-
cessor sections to those predecessor sections, it was five shillings prior 
to 1809.' 0 3 The pedigree is unbroken and the line of descent is clear. 
In 1691, the act of 3 W. & M., ch. 9 § § 1-4 dealt with two allied 
situations. In dealing with the first, it proscribed (by denying clergy) 
stealing from a dwelling house in the daytime, "the owner or any other 
person being therein and put in fear." A live victim had to be present 
and put in fear, but neither a bre:aking nor a five shilling minimum for 
the consummated larceny was required. The very same section of the 
act (harbingering the later Maryland practice of joining distinct bur-
glary-type offenses in the same section) went on to proscribe the 
breaking of any "dwelling house, shop or warehouse, thereunto belong-
ing or therewith used" and stealing goods of the value of five shillings 
or upwards, although no person shall be within. In the latter portion, as 
opposed to the former, 1) a breaking was required, 2) a five shilling 
minimum was set on the consummated larceny 3) no victim need be 
present and 4) shops and warehouses were covered as well as dwelling 
houses, provided they were appurtenant.' 0 4 "Shop" and "warehouse" 
both appear in the present law of Maryland, ' os although they have lost 
the formerly required characteristic of appurtenance. 
98. See generally 1 RAOZINOWICZ 45-46. 
99. See generally 2 EAST 628; 1 HAWKINS 209-11; 1 RAOZINOWICZ 46. 
100. MD. ANN. Coos art. 27, § 32 (1971). 
101. Id. § 33; id. § 342 (Supp. 1973). 
102. See Law of March 28, 1952, ch. 18, § 1, [1952) Laws of Md. 229. 
103. See Law of Nov. 1809, ch. 138, § 5, 3 [1811) Laws of Md. 462. 
104. 1 HAWKINS 209; 1 RAOZINOWICZ 46-47. 
105. MD. ANN. Coos art. 27, § 33 (1971); id. § 342 (Supp. 1973). 
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This plethora of overlapping statutory provisions-not literally creat:. 
ing crimes but in effect creating them by recognizing these aggravated 
forms of grand larceny punishable by death-generated confusion and 
which was early noted. East comments that "the multiplicity of these 
provisions is apt to create some confusion. ,,1 06 Sergeant Hawkins 
refers to "a variety of statutes ... passed upon this subject, which are 
rather complicated."1 0 7 The common denominator of all the provi-
sions is articulated by Hawkins: 
The principal sanction is the dwelling-house, and it has been 
considered by the legislature as a great aggravation of the 
offense of larceny, that the sanctity of the dwelling-house 
should be violated, by committing the crime therein .... 1 0 8 
He makes it clear that the base crime is still larceny and that the 
violation of the dwelling house is the aggravating factor. Blackstone is 
to the same effect: 
Larciny [sic] from the house, though it seems ... to have a 
higher degree of guilt than simple larciny, yet it is not at all 
distinguished from the other at common law, unless where it is 
accompanied with the circumstance of breaking the house by 
night, and then we have seen that it falls under another descrip-
tion, viz., that of burglary, ... the benefit of clergy is taken 
from larcinies committed in a house in almost every in-
stance .... 109 
When, therefore, the Maryland law of 1681 referred for the flISt 
ascertainable time to "Robery [sic], Burglary and house break-
ings, "1 1 0 it is far from clear what precise conduct was being proscribed 
by that hydra-headed concept of "house breakings." It is significant 
that in the act only "house breakings" is non-capitalized and is in the 
plural. 
It is immediately to be noted that none of the English forms of 
housebreaking proscribe the breaking of a dwelling house in the day-
time with intent to commit felony therein, the direct daytime analogue 
to common law burglary. Such an offense may have existed in mis-
demeanor form, but at the early common law, to be a misdemeanor was 
virtually to be no crime at all. Misdemeanors carried no term of 
imprisonment but only small pecuniary amercements (not even literally 
fines). Through the 13th century, misdemeanors were indistinguishable 
from civil actions involving trespass. Even when they aoquired an 
identity of their own, they were tried simply in the local courts. As a 
result, they appeared but rarely in the Year Books and their existence 
106. 2 EAST 623 . 
. 107. 1 HAWKINS 200. 
108. [d. at 199. 
109. 4 BLACKSTONE *239-40. 
110. Law of Aug. 1681, ch. 3, Laws of Md., in 7 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 202. 
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was largely unknown until recent scholarship began to discover and 
print the records of justices of the peace.1 1 1 
Although problematic, it does seem that daytime housebreaking with 
intent to commit felony therein was probably a minor misdemeanor or 
trespass of some sort. It has been noted that "neither at common law, 
nor under any statute, is it felony simply to break a house in the 
daytime, but only when followed by theft .... "1 1 2 After reciting the 
litany of English housebreaking statutes, Holdsworth concludes: "The 
result was that housebreaking in the daytime, unless it fell within some 
one· of these statutes, sank to the level of a misdemeanor."1 1 3 
It was not until 1861 that the act of 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 96, § 57, 
raised to felony status in England the offenses of breaking and entering, 
inter alia., a dwelling house, a shop or a warehouse with intent to 
commit a felony therein. Lord Russell commented: "This clause is new, 
and contains a very important improvement of the law. Fonnerly the. 
offences here provided for were only misdemeanors at common law. 
Now it often happened that such an offence was very inadequately 
punished as a misdemeanor .... "1 1 4 
When the crime was first recognized in Maryland is an unsolved 
mystery. It has been remarked by Semmes that: 
In the printed records of early Maryland there are few referen-
ces to burglary or to housebreaking. Burglary, at common law, 
was the breaking and entering the dwelling house of another, in 
the nighttime, with the intent of committing a felony therein. 
Housebreaking, on the other hand, was the act of breaking open 
and entering, with a felonious intent, the dwelling house of 
another, by day or night. 1 I 5 
Since the only case found in the early records by Semmes to support 
this proposition is one where one Robert Dennis was indicted for 
breaking and entering on December 24, 1665, the dwelling house of 
Phillip Calvert, at Wolsey Manor, and stealing therefrom one Carbine of 
the value of 15 shillings and one shirt of the value of two shillings, I 16 
it is clear that the indictment was brought under 39 Eliz., ch. 15 
(1597).1 1 7 It is thus no authority for the existence of the crime of 
breaking a dwelling with intent to steal as opposed to breaking and 
actually stealing. Semmes apparently read the modem crime into the 
Eiizabethan predecessor. 
An act of the Assembly in 1654 required that fourfold restitution be 
made in all cases of larceny! 18 but then went on to allow a greater 
111. PLUCKNETT 455-62; 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 511-22. 
112. H. HAMMOND, CRIMINAL CODE 112 (1826); 1 RADZINOWICZ 43 n.8. 
113. 3 HOLDSWORTH 369. 
114. 3 W. RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 96 (9th ed. 1877). 
115. R. SEMMES, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MARYLAND 56 (1938). 
116. 49 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, PROCEEDINGS OF THE PROVINCIAL COURT 1663-66, at 542. 
117. See pp. 42-43 supra. 
118. The notion of fourfold restitution is a concept of damages carried over from its Quasi-civil 
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discretionary punishment should the theft be accompanied by other 
action such as "breaking open the house. HI 1 9 The reference was still to 
comp01.m.d larceny. 
The first clear reference that can be discovered in Maryland case or 
statutory law to housebreaking or storehouse breaking with intent 
(other than the cryptic and undefmed reference to "housebreakings" in 
the 1681 lawl 20 and in the 1715 law) 1 "21 was post-Revolutionary. In 
1793, the jurisdiction to try certain criminal cases in Baltimore County 
was transferred from the general county court to a newly created (by 
the act) Court of Oyer and Terminer. The list of affected crimes 
included: 
[B] reaking a dwelling-house in the day time, with an intent to 
murder or commit a felony therein; or breaking a store-house, 
warehouse, or other out-house, in the day or night, with an 
inten1" to commit murder or felony therein .... 1 2 2 
The h· .;uage as to intent was straight out of common law burglary. 
The catalogue of "storehouse, warehouse, or other outhouse" was 
straig1 It of 39 Eliz., ch. 15 (1597) and 3 W. & M., ch. 9 (1691).1 23 
fhe ,nses were clearly misdemeanors and they were clearly not 
<-reate· ~y the law of 1793, which simply referred to them as pre-
existing crimes. The two offenses of housebreaking with intent and 
storehouse breaking with intent were also already joined in that cohabi-
tation within a common statutory provision that would not be severed 
until 1965. 1 2 ~ 
It is curious that in this Maryland statute, and in all subsequent 
statutes, the only critical verb is "break." It is probable that historic 
accident accounts for the fact that the Maryland "breaking with intent" 
crimes 1 25 require only a breaking and not an entering. The accident 
unquestionably resulted from looking to the form and not the su~ 
stance of the predecessor English statutes. All of those English statutes 
required a consummated crime inside the protected structure, and the 
entry which had to be spelled out as to burglary, was therefore implicit 
in the housebreaking and storehouse breaking situations. Once Mary-
land abandoned the requirement of a consummated crime "therein" 
and let a mere intent suffice as to storehouse and daytime dwelling 
house violations, the entry was no longer implicit. To follow then the 
mere explicit wording of English housebreaking statutes without pro-
viding for that which in England, but no longer in Maryland, could be 
implied was to diminish the character of the violation of the protected 
past, when criminal misdemeanors and actions for trespass were virtually indistinguisha· 
ble. 
119. SEMMES, supra note 115, ~t 55. 
120. Law of Aug. 1681, ch. 3,Laws of Md., in 7 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 202. 
121. Law of April 1715, ch. 26, § 11, 1 [IS11) Laws of Md. 88. 
122. Law of Nov. 1793, ch. 57, § 10, 2 [IS11) Laws of Md. 215. 
123. See p. 43 supra. 
124. Law of AprilS, 1965, ch. 345, § 1, (1965) Laws of Md. 505-06. 
125. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 30(b), 32 (1971); id. § 342 (Supp. 1973). 
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building. When "daytime housebreaking with felonious intent" was 
finally raised to felony status in the act of 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 96, § 57 
(1861), it did not neglect to include the verb "enter" along with the 
verb "break." By slavishly following English phraseology without 
analyzing English substance, we may inadvertently have eliminated an 
element of the crime. We may also, however, have inadvertently pro-
vided a remedy for our initial inadvertence by so diluting the meaning 
of "enter" as to make every "breaking" tantamount to an "entry." 
Two wrongs may make a right after all. 
Although now so time-honored as to be beyond remedy, a misread-
ing or non-reading of the early history, it strongly appears, has ac-
counted for the fact that our present section 32,1 26 refers to other 
buildings generally and is not· restricted to outbuildings either within 
the curtilage of a mansion house or appurtenant thereto. The original 
language of "storehouse, warehouse or other outhouse" was taken from 
the acts of 39 Eliz., ch. 15 (1597) and 3 W. & M., ch. 9 (1691), where 
appurtenance was clearly required. Indeed, those buildings which were 
non-appurtenant outbuildings were protected by a separate provision of 
Maryland colonial law. 1 2 7 That other provision (the direct ancestor of 
our "breaking and stealing" laws) required a consummated larceny. It 
further contained the explicit language "not contiguous to or used with 
any mansion house." The "breaking and stealing" provision would have 
been redundant if a different class of buildings was not being protected. 
Indeed, the whole course of development of English burglary law 
displayed a special solicitude for the personal safety of the homeowner 
in his outbuildings (whether literally surrounded by a fence or wall or 
not) and in his shop with its storehouse or warehouse generally be-
neath. In "a nation of small shopkeepers," the shop and the home were 
virtually one and the same. Indeed, later development of English law 
makes it a critical factor whether there is interior communication 
between the dwelling and the shop or storehouse, a factor which clearly 
implies appurtenance and highlights the consideration of the personal 
safety 'Of the occupant. I 2 8 Maryland took and retained the English 
language but somewhere along the way forgot the connotation that 
went with the language. 
In any event, when Maryland undertook its first major organization 
of the criminal law in 1809, it carried into section 5(5) the language 
verbatim from the 1793 law with respect to breaking a dwelling house: 
[B] reaking into any shop, storehouse, tobacco-house or 
commit murder or felony therein, or of breaking a storehouse, 
warehouse or other out-house, in the day or night, with an 
intent to commit murder or felony therein .... I 2 9 
126. Id. § 32 (1971). 
127. Law of July 1729, ch. 4, § 3,1 [1811] Laws of Md. 190. 
128. 3 RUSSEIJ. 93-97. 
129. Law of Nov. 1809, ch. 138, § 5(5), 3 [1811] Laws of Md. 461; text cited note 121 supra. This 
section dealt with "the offense ... affecting the habitation, houses or vessels of 
individuals ..... 
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Immediately following this provision, section 5(6) went on to pro-
scribe: 
[B]reaking into any shop, storehouse, tobacco-house or 
warehouse, although the same be not contiguous to or used 
with any mansion-house, and stealing from thence any money, 
goods or chattels, to the value of one dollar, or up-
wards .... ' 30 
The juxtaposition of these two subsections clearly implied that, in 
original intent, the "storehouse, warehouse or other out-house" of 
section 5(5) was not synonymous with the "shop, storehouse, tobacco-
house or warehouse" of section 5(6). This conclusion is unavoidable 
when 1) section 5(6) contains the language of non-appurtenant qualifi-
cation "although the same be not contiguous to or used with any 
mansion-house" which section 5(5) does not; 2) section 5(6) requires a 
consummated larceny subsequent to the breaking which section 5(5) 
does not; 3) section 5(6), if it had been intended to cover the same 
buildings as section 5(5), would have been virtually tautologous, with 
the conduct it proscribed being subsumed within the proscription of 
section 5( 5). ' 3 , 
It is also far from clear whether the inclusion of the "breaking with 
intent" provisions in the law of 1809 was intended to preempt the 
housebreaking field and to consign the other forms of housebreaking to 
the dustbin of history. Writing in 1811, Chancellor Kilty makes clear 
that the various Tudor and Stuart housebreaking statutes-23 Hen. 8, 
ch. 1 (1531); 1 Edw. 6, ch. 12 (1547); 5 & 6 Edw. 6, ch. 9 (1552); 39 
Eliz., ch. 15 (1597); and 3 W. & M., ch. 9 (1691)-extended to and 
were in use in the Maryland province. In commenting on 1 Edw. 6, ch. 
12 (1597), Chancellor Kilty remarks: 
As to the 2d class, there are in the provincial records some cases 
of prosecutions, which appear to have been under this statute, 
and still more under those of 39 Eliz., ch. 15 and 3 and 4 W. 
and M., ch: 9, both before and after our acts of assembly 
respecting housebreaking, in which the offenders were capitally 
convicted.' 32 . 
In commenting again on 3 W. & M., ch. 9 (1691), the Chancellor 
remarks: 
130. Law of Nov. 1809, ch. 138, § 5(6), 3 (1811) Laws of Md. 462 . 
. 131. It cannot be conceived that § 5(6) was included in the act simply to provide for a law 
school examination-type hypothetical such as where the larcenous intent was not formed 
until after the breaking was complete. It was also clear that unless the two subsections 
and their successor sections contemplated different categories of buildings, the "breaking 
and stealing" provisions would never have had an adequate raison d'etre until the Law of 
March 29, 1943, ch. 229, § 1, (1943) Laws of Md. 241-42, raised the minimum larcenous 
intent for the "breaking with intent" offense above the level of the minimum 
consummated larceny under the "breaking and stealing" offense. 
132. W_ KILTY, BRITISH STATUTES IN FORCE IN MARYLAND 164, 179 (1811) [hereinafter cited as 
KILTY). 
1974] Maryland's Burglary and Larceny Laws 
This statute or a part of it, certainly extended to the province, 
with others respecting the benefit of clergy. It took away that 
benefit from persons robbing a dwelling house, wherein there 
was any or no person, and there are several cases of indictments 
for such offenses apparently under this statute. 1 3 3 
49 
Since the literal thrust of all the English statutes, however, was to 
deny the benefit of clergy to the offenders and since section 11 of the 
Maryland 1809 statute abolished the very concept of benefit of 
clergy,1 34 Chancellor Kilty placed all of the statutes in question in the 
category "Statutes Found Applicable But Not Proper To Be Incorpo-
rated. ,,1 3 5 
In holding the various English housebreaking statutes "not proper to 
be incorporated," Kilty did so only because those statutes dealt literally 
with punishment. The 1809 statute, section 11, did not abolish any of 
the clergyable or non-clergyable offenses. It rather provided explicitly . 
that: 
[E) very person who shall be convicted of any felony heretofore 
excluded from the benefit of clergy, and not herein specified, 
shall be sentenced to undergo a confinement in the penitentiary 
for a period of time not less than five nor more than twenty 
years .... 136 
Kilty was very much in doubt as to whether the explicit provisions of 
lIection 5 of the law of 1809 had preempted the housebreaking field. In 
commenting on that statute he remarked: 
[I] t does not take in all the kinds of larceny from the house, 
which were succesively provided for by the English statutes. 
How far that act will go to the repeal of the former acts of 
assembly on the subject, it is not necessary to enquire; but 
considering the apparent intention of the legislature in passing 
the act of 1809, it is not deemed proper that this statute, or any 
other taking away the benefit of clergy from the offense Qf 
larceny from the house, or house breaking should be incorpo-
rated with our laws, even if it should appear that they are not 
all virtually repealed by that act. 1 3 7 
Despite the absence of a clear-cut epitaph, however, the other forms of 
housebreaking never reappeared and the law of 1809, de facto at least, 
did preempt the field. 1 38 
133. Id. 
134. Law of Nov. 1809, ch. § ll, 3 [18llJ Laws of Md. 468. 
135. KILTY 160, 164-66, 179-80. 
136. Law of Nov. 1809, ch. 138, § ll, 3 [18llJ Laws of Md. 468. 
137. KILTY 164-65. 
138. For the myriad forms taken by the burglary, housebreaking and storehouse breaking laws 
in the other states, see Note, A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 1009 
(1951); Note, Statutory Burg/4ry-The Magic of Four Walls and a Roof, 100 U. PA. L. 
REV. 4ll (1951). 
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For the next 124 years, the "breaking with intent" offenses re-
mained unchanged. To break a dwelling house in the daytime and to 
break a "storehouse, warehouse or other out-house" in the daytime or 
the nighttime "with intent to commit murder or felony therein" was 
proscribed in a single section of the article on "Crimes and Punish-
ments," without so much as a penalty altered or a single building added 
to the catalog of "out-houses". Legislation in 1933, however, changed 
the character of petty larceny from felony to misdemeanor. I 3 9 It had, 
inevitably, the same effect on the "breaking with intent" offenses that 
it did on common. law burglary. The question arose, or should have 
arisen, as to whether there was carved out from th'e formerly all-
inclusive felonious intent provision, a significant chunk of still lar-
cenous, but no longer felonious, intent. The legislature met the problem 
in a strange way. In the same legislative act which changed the character 
of petty larceny, there was created a new section within the subtitle 
"Larceny." It followed immediately the section dealing with petty 
larceny, which proscribed the breaking into "any shop, storehouse, 
tobacco house or warehouse, although the same be not contiguous to or 
used with any mansion house, with intent to steal any money, goods or 
chattels under the value of twenty-five dollars .... "I 4 0 Although this 
new section was ultimately to be the complement to the "storehouse 
breaking with intent" provision found under the subtitle of "Burglary", 
its litany of protected structures and its explicit language of non-
appurtenance paralleled the "breaking and stealing" offenses rather 
than the "breaking with intent" offense. The effort to insure against 
the erosion of some larcenous intent was apparently inadvertent, since 
no corresponding change was made in the complementary burglary 
provision I 4 I nor was any effort made to protect against the erosion of 
some larcenous intent from either the "housebreaking with intent" 
provision I 4 2 or from common law burglary. I 4 3 
It was not until four ye~ later, triggered perhaps by the fact that 
the case of State v. Wileyl 44 was already in the appellate mill, that the 
thought seemed to occur that something might now be missing from 
the burglary and housebreaking laws. As a result, in 1937, a new 
statutory burglary provision was added I 4 5 and the above mentioned 
complementary provision was amended by adding to the intent provi- 0 
sions of both daytime housebreaking and daytime or nighttime store-
house breaking the additional phrase "or with the intent to steal take or 
carry away the personal goods of another of any value therefrom. ,,1 4 6 
The intent proviEions of both housebreaking and storehouse breaking 
139. Law of Dec. 15, 1933, ch. 78, § I, [1933) Laws of Md. Spec. Sess. 249-50. 
140. Id. at 251. 
141. Law of Nov. 1809, ch: 138, § 5(6), 3 [1811) Laws of Md. 462. 
142. Id. § 5(5), 3 [1811) Laws of Md. 461. 
143. Id. § 5(4). 
144. 173 Md. 119, 194 A. 629 (1937). 
145. Law of May 18, 1937, ch. 141, § I, [1937) Laws of Md. 262. 
146. Id. 
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thus remained both parallel to each other and parallel to the intent 
provision of burglary. 
For the next six years, an apparent incongruity existed whereby an 
offender who would break a storehouse with the intent to steal goods 
therefrom of some value but of less than twenty-five dollars in value 
could be subject to a maximum of ten years in the penitentiary in the 
burglary subtitle I 4 7 and for the very same offense be subjected to not 
more than eighteen months imprisonment in the larceny subtitle. I 4 8 A 
1943 statute was passed for the purpose of "altering and harmonizing 
certain provisions of the Criminal Law dealing with the breaking into 
certain buildings with the intent to steal. "I 4 9 The intent provision of 
the burglary statute was left intact as to dwelling houses, but as to 
"storehouses, warehouses or other outhouses," was changed to read 
"with the intent to steal take or carry away the personal goods of 
another of the value of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) .or more there- . 
from .... HI 5 0 Thus, for the first time since they appeared together in 
1793, I 5 I do housebreaking and storehouse breaking diverge in their 
intent provisions. 
At least, however, between the venerable "storehouse breaking with 
intent" provision under the burglary subtitle and the bastard. "store-
house breaking with intent" provision that appeared, seemingly by 
accident, in 1933 in the larceny subtitle, reconcilation was for the 
moment effected between the measures of larcenous intent. The legisla-
tive habit of dealing with the larceny subtitle in utter disregard of the 
complementary provisions in the burglary subtitle and vice versa, how-
ever, persisted. In 1937, the words "or other buildingS" were added to 
the litany of protected structures in the new larceny provision enacted 
in 1933,1 52 without making any cOlresponding changes in the sup-
posedly complementary provisions under the burglary subtitle.1 5 3 Con-
versely, a 1947 act added to the list of protected structures under 
"storehouse breaking with intent" and under "breaking and stealing" 
the words "filling station, garage, trailer, cabin,' diner" within the 
burglary subtitle I 54 without making corresponding changes in the 
supposedly complementary provisions under the larceny subtitle. 1 55 
In 1962, the intent prOvision again went awry. The cut-off point 
between petty larceny and grand larceny was raised from twenty to one 
hundred dollars.1 56 With a weather eye out to attendant sections 
within the larceny subtitle, it also raised the intent provision under 
storehouse breaking to provide for anyone breaking a shop, etc. "with 
147. Id. 
148. Id., ch. 305, § 1, [1937] Laws of Md. 578. 
149. Law of March 29, 1943, ch. 229, [1943] Laws of Md. 241. 
150. Id., § 1, [19431 Laws of Md. 242. 
151. Law of Nov. 1793, ch. 57, § 10, 2 [1811] Laws of Md. 215. 
152. Law of May 18, 1937, ch. 305, § 1, [1937] Laws of Md. 578. 
153. Law of Nov. 1809, ch. 138, §§ 5(5)-(6), 3 [1811] Laws of Md. 461-62. 
154. Law of March 15, 1947, ch. 142, § 1, [19471 Laws of Md. 209. 
155. Law of March 29, 1943, ch. 229, § 1, [1943] Laws of Md. 242. 
156. Law of March 28, 1952, ch. 18, § 1, [1952] Laws of Md. 228. 
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intent to steal any money, goods or chattels under the value of 
One-Hundred Dollars .... "I 5 7 No corresponding change was made, 
however, in its supposedly complementary section under the burglary 
subtitle. I 5 8 Thus, for the next eight years an incongruity for yet a 
second time persisted whereby an offender who broke a storehouse 
with the intent to steal goods of the value of twenty-five dollars or 
upwards but of under the value of one hundred dollars could be 
subjected to ten years in the penitentiary under the burglary subtitle 
but for the very same offense could be subjected to imprisoriment of 
not more than eighteen months under the larceny subtitle. In 1960, 
symmetry was restored to the storehouse breaking with intent situation 
by raising the intent provision in the burglary subtitle from "$25 and 
upwards" to "$100 and upwards".1 5 9 
The intent provisions are now reconciled, but the reconciliation is 
tenuous at best, since in 1968, "boat" was added to the list of 
protected structures under the present sections 32 and 33 under the 
burglary subtitle I 6 0 and completely neglected to make the correspond-
ing changes in the supposedly complementary provisions of section 342 
under the larceny subtitle. I 6 1 The two subtitles somehow refuse to be 
viewed together. 
In the welter of confusion in the wake of petty larceny's changed 
status (1933) and changing dimensions (1933 and 1952), "daytime 
housebreaking with intent" and "storehouse breaking with intent/' 
which had been so completely compatible probably from birth and 
demonstrably from 1793, began to go their own ways. The estrange-
ment which began in 1943, when their intent provisions diverged, was 
completed in 1965. In the latter year, daytime housebreaking was lifted 
out of its then current section1 62 and placed in with a new statutory 
burglary section. I 6 3 By the same act, the status of daytime house-
breaking was changed from misdemeanor to felony. "Storehouse break-
ing with intent," which now abided for the first time alone, remained a 
misdemeanor. 
The tale was brought up to date a year . later when the status of 
"storehouse breaking with intent" was changed from misdemeanor to 
felony. I 64 
BREAKING AND STEALING-THE COMPOUND LARCENIES 
Maryland's storehouse breaking and stealing laws1 6 5 are descended 
either from 3 W. & M., ch. 9 (1691), or from 10 & 11 Will. 3, ch. 23 
157. [d. at 229. 
158. Law of March 15, 1947, ch. 142, § 1, [1947] Laws of Md. 209. 
159. Law of March 2, 1960, ch. 40, § 1, [1960] Laws of Md. 71. 
160. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 32-33 (1971). 
161. [d. § 342 (Supp. 1973). 
162. Law of March 2, 1960, ch. 40, § 1, [1960] Laws of Md. 71. 
163. Law of April 8, 1965, § 1, [1965] Laws of Md. 505-06. 
164. Law of May 6, 1966, ch. 628, § 1, [1966] Laws of Md. 1125. 
165. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 33 (1971); id. § 342 (Supp. 1973). 
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(1699), or from an intermixture of both. 
The act of 3 W. & M., ch. 9, was discussed above l 66 and proscribed, 
inter alia., the breaking of any "shop or warehouse" belonging to a 
dwelling house and stealing therefrom goods of the value of five 
shillings or upwards. The act of 10 & 11 Will. 3, ch. 23, proscribed 
the private stealing, by night or by day, of goods of the value of five 
shillings or above from "shops, warehouses, coach houses or stables." 
For the first time in English statutes, the premises described were not 
required to be appurtenant to a dwelling house. 1 6 7 Unlike its possible 
Maryland descendant, the English statute did not require a breaking. 
The English cases interpreting the statute stressed the "privately steal-
ing" aspect of the offense and actually precluded a "breaking" situation 
from its compass, because "any degree of force excluded the idea of 
privately stealing. "I 6 8 Spiritually, the offense seems to have been 
closer to latter-day shoplifting laws than to latter-day breaking and . 
stealing from storehouse laws. Chancellor Kilty found 10 & 11 Will. 3, 
ch. 23, one of those statutes "not found applicable to the local and 
other circumstances nor introduced, used or practiced by the Courts of 
Law" of the Maryland Province. He felt that: 
Notwithstanding the general extension of the statutes relating 
to house-breaking, or larceny from the house, there is reason to 
believe that this was not among them. It was applicable in part 
to a species of larceny called in England shop-lifting, which was 
not likely to be much practiced in the·province, and no case has 
.been found of a prosecution that appeared to be under this 
statute. 1 69 
The case for 3 W. & M., ch. 9 as the lineal antecedent of Maryland's 
"breaking and stealing" laws seems much stronger, although the parent-
age may have been mixed. 
In either event, within thirty-eight years of the enactment of 3 W. & 
M., ch. 9, and within thirty years of the enactment of 10 & 11 Will. 3, 
ch. 23, the Maryland Provincial Assembly was faced with the problem. 
In 1729, the legislature stated, by way of preamble: . 
[W] hereas several felons have feloniously broke and entered 
several shops, store-houses or warehouses, not contiguous to or 
used with any mansion-house, and stolen from thence several 
goods and merchandises, and that it hath been doubted whether 
such offenders are, by any law now on force, excluded the 
benefit of clergy . . . .1 7 0 
166. See p. 46 supra. 
167. See 2 EAST 629; 1 HAWKINS 201-03; 1 RADZINOWICZ 47-48. 
168. Cartwright's Case, Old Bailey (1776), cited at 1 HAWKINS 203. 
169. KILTY 104. Ironically, Maryland did not enact a true shoplifting law until 1961. Law of 
April 24, 1961, ch. 269, [1961) Laws of Md. 325-28 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 
551A (1971)). 
170. Law of July 1729, ch. 4, § 3, 1 [1811) Laws of Md. 190. 
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The act of 1729 then went on not to create the crime-for larceny 
was already a crime-but rather to recognize this particular fonn of 
aggravation of the crime for punishment purposes (the denial of clergy). 
It provided that: 
[I] f any person or persons shall ... break into any shop, store· 
house or ware house, although such shop, store-house or ware 
house, be not contiguous to or used with any mansion-house, 
and steal from thence any goods, to the value of five shillings, 
and be thereof convict, by confession, or verdict of a jury, such 
offender or offenders shall suffer death as felons, without 
benefit of clergy .... 1 7 1 
, 
The requirement of a breaking had to come from 3 W. & M., ch. 9 
rather than from 10 & 11 Will. 3, ch. 23. The application to "shops" 
and "warehouses" could have come from either English statute, al-
though the Maryland act included "storehouse", which neither of the 
English statutes included, and the Maryland act did not include "coach 
houses or stables", which were a part of 10 & 11 Will. 3, ch. 23. The 
Maryland provision of non-appurtenance, however, was found in 10 & 
11 Will. 3, ch. 23, but not in 3 W. & M., ch. 9. The five shilling 
requirement was found in both English statutes and, indeed, traced 
back to 39 Eliz., ch. 15 (1597)} 72 
Eight years later, the provision was faced with a crime wave zeroing 
. in on tobacco houses. A 1737 statute recited in its preamble: 
Forasmuch as all the laws heretofore made for the punishment 
of offenders, and for securing honest men in their just property, 
are found by experience to be insufficient for those purposes, 
and that the poorer sort of people, who are obliged, for want of 
better conveniences, to keep their goods in tobacco-houses, and 
other out-houses, are most exposed to be pillaged and robbed of 
their substance th&n persons of greater ability, and that consid-
erable part of the property of people of all conditions, are kept 
in out-houses, not only remote from their dwelling-houses, but 
also very weak in themselves, and easily broken, which hath 
given .frequent opportunities to offenders to break into such 
houses, and to steal from thence divers goods and chattels, to 
the utter undoing of some poor persons, and the prejudice of all 
sufferers . . . .1 7 3 
The act went on to provide: 
That any person ... who shall ... break any tobacco-house, or 
other out-house Whatsoever, and steal from thence any goods or 
171. [d. at 190-91. 
172. The use of the five shilling figure as the touchstone of aggravation can be traced back as 
far as Chapter n of the Assize of Clarendon (1166), wherein the new grand juries were 
required to present anyone in the countryside who had stolen as much as five shillings in 
value since the beginning of King Henry n's reign (twelve years earlier). 
173. Law of April 1737, ch. 2, § I, 1 [1811] Laws of Md. 210. 
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chattels, to the value of five shillings sterlin¥ ... shall suffer 
death as a felon ... without benefit of clergy. 1 4 
55 
This act of 1737 added to the list of protected structures "tobacco-
houses or other out-houses whatsoever. ,,1 75 The act was to continue in 
force for three years, but was extended from time to time on 
numerous occasions, and was enacted as a permanent law in 1798.1 76 
No further changes were made in the "breaking and stealing" law 
until 1809 when the provisions of the acts of 1729 and 1737 were 
incorporated into the new statute. It proscribed the 
breaking into any shop, storehouse, tobacco-house or ware-
house, although the same be not contiguous to or used with any 
mansion-house, and stealing from thence any money, goods or 
chattels, to the value of one dollar, or upwards .... 1 7 7 
The only slight modifications in translating the provisional acts into 
the act of 1809 were (1) that the "other out-house" provision from the 
act of 1737 was not retained and (2) that the critical monetary value 
placed on the consummated larceny was changed from five shillings to 
one dollar. 1 7 a 
The 1809 statute then broke strange new ground. In section 6 
dealing with offenses "affecting private property," the stealing of 
personal goods of under the value of five dollars was proscribed a&> 
"petty larceny" and then within the very Same sentence, for the first 
time, a lower and complementary "breaking and stealing" offense was 
enacted. It was provided that: . 
If any person shall feloniously steal, take and carry away, the 
personal goods of another, under the value of five dollars, or if 
any person shall break into any shop, storehouse, tobacco-house 
or warehouse, although the same be not contiguous to, or used 
with, any mansion-house, and steal any money, goods or chat-
tels, under the value of one dollar ... shall be deemed guilty of 
petty larceny, 1 7 9 and shall ... be ... sentenced to undergo a 
similar confinement for a period not less than three months nor 
more than one year .... 1 a 0 
174. ld. § 2, 1 (1811) Laws of Md. 210-11. 
175. It is doubtful whether a further provision consigning to the gallows anyone (1) who, upon 
being charged, "obstinately or of malice stood mute" or (2) who "peremptorily challenged 
above twenty" jurors would pass present day Constitutional muster. 
176. Law of Nov. 1798, ch. 71,2 (1800) Laws of Md. See generally Putnam v. State, 234 Md. 
537,542-43,200 A.2d 59,62 (1964). 
177. Law of Nov. 1809, ch. 138, § 5(6), 3 (1811) Laws of Md. 462. 
178. This change was actually somewhat deflationary. Since at the time, the pound sterling 
(or twenty shillings) was worth five dollars, the effect of the act of 1809 was to lower the 
critical aggravating point from five shillings to the equivalent of four shillings. 
179. The use of "petty larceny" in this section is clearly an exception to the situation described 
in text at note 'Z1 supra and in Melia v. State, 5 Md. App. 354, 360 n.5, 247 A.2d 554, 560 
n.10 (1968). 
180. Law of Nov. 1809, ch. 138, § 6(6), 3 (1811) Laws of Md. 463. 
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This provision is strange for two reasons. In the fIrst place, except as 
a gesture to symmetry, it was completely unnecessary and its successor 
provisions have remained so to this day. To break and steal under one 
dollar (or today, under five dollars) is petty larceny in any event and 
subject to precisely the same penalty provisions as for simple petty 
larceny. To allege and prove the additional aggravating element of 
"breaking a shop, storehouse, tobacco-house or warehouse" is an exer-
cise in futility. The petty larceny is aggravated or compounded to no 
avail. 
In the second place, the geography of the provision is strange when 
viewed in conjunction with the setting of its complementary provision 
in section 5(6). Both offenses involve the breaking of similar structures 
and therefore represent the same threat against "habitation." The 
difference between them is in the degree of the threat against "private 
property." Ironically, the offense which is no more a threat to "habita-
tion" than its complementary section but is more of a threat against 
"private property" joined the offenses affecting "habitations" in sec-
tion 5" and has remained with the burglary subtitle to this day. The 
complementary offense which is just as great a threat to "habitation" 
but a lesser threat to "private property" joined the offenses affecting 
"private property" in section 6 and has remained with the larceny 
subtitle to this day. The thought as to whether these crimes are 
properly to be classifIed as crimes against property, against habitation 
or against persons has been schizophrenic at best. 
The two storehouse breaking and stealing offenses that began as 
complements to one another in the act of 1809, then took off on 
destinies of their own. Breaking and stealing of the value of under one 
dollar remained closeted as an offense within the same statutory provi-
sion as petty larceny until 1933 when (1) the grand larceny-petty 
larceny demarcation line was raised from fIve to twenty-fIve dollars, (2) 
petty larceny was changed from a felony to a misdemeanor, (3) jurisdic-
tion was conferred upon justices of the peace (outside of Baltimore 
City) to hear petty larceny cases and (4) the offense of breaking a 
storehouse with intent to steal goods of under the value of twenty-five 
dollars was created. 1 81 It also created a new section wherein (1) the 
old storehouse breaking and stealing under one dollar and (2) the new 
storehouse breaking with intent to steal less than twenty-five dollars 
could be lodged together and separate from petty larceny which re-
mained under a separate section. 1 82 These two lesser storehouse of-
fenses have remained together to this day.1 8 3 
In 1937, the lesser storehouse breaking and stealing offense added 
"other building" to its list of protected structures,1 84 while its comple-
mentary section in. the burglary subtitle did not. This was the only 
181. Law of Dec. 15, 1933, ch. 78, § I, [1933] Laws of Md. Spec. Sess. 249-51. 
182. Id. 
183. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342 (Supp. 1973). 
184. Law of May 18, 1937, ch. 305, § I, [1937] Laws of Md. 578. 
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addition to its list from 1809 to date. In 1947, the greater storehouse 
breaking and stealing offense, in tandem with the breaking with intent 
offense, added "filling station, garage, trailer, cabin and diner" to its list 
of protected structures! 115 and in 1968, again in tandem with the 
breaking with intent offense, added "boat" to the list, l 86 while on 
neither occasion was a change made in the supposedly complementary 
section within the larceny subtitle. 
The intent provisions, which were complementary in 1809, went 
askew in 1952, and were reconciled again in 1960. In 1952, the 
maximum figure for storehouse breaking and stealing was raised from 
one dollar to five dollars. 1 II 7 Nothing, however, was done to the 
theretofore corresponding minimum figure in the supposedly comple-
mentary section in the burglary subtitle. 1 88 For eight years, a person 
breaking a storehouse and stealing therefrom goods of the value of 
one dollar or over but under five dollars was subject to a maximum 
sentence of ten years in the penitentiary under the burglary subtitle but 
for the same offense could receive no more th~ eighteen months 
imprisonment under the larceny subtitle. In 1960, the reconciliation 
was effected by raising the minimum figure from one dollar to five 
dollars in the burglary provision. 1 8 9 The sections are again comple-
mentary and have, thus far, lived happily ever after. 
To bring the tale completely to date, in 1966, the status of store-
house breaking and stealing five dollars or upwards was raised from 
misdemeanor to felony. 1 9 0 
CONCLUSION 
Thus have the compound larcenies been compounded. Thus, haltingly 
but inexorably, has Saxon hamsocn come to protect a department store 
in downtown Baltimore. Twelve pence has become one hundred dollars 
and even inflation has probably not kept pace with the price of "a 
pasture-fed ox." Benefit' of clergy did not survive to be tested by the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Where, then, 
does all of this leave our maligned indictment clerk? 
From the vantage point of a thousand years of history, a count 
charging housebreaking in language redolent of storehouse breaking is 
neither bizarre nor incomprehensible. From their common origin, from 
their centuries of cohabitation within a single statutory provision and 
from their sharing of the same intent proviso, one can picture these 
variations on a single theme being played on a common indictment 
185. Law of March 15, 1947, ch. 142, § I, [1947] Laws of Md. 209. 
186. Law of May 7, 1968, ch. 508, § I, [1968] Laws of Md. 944. 
187. Law of March 28, 1952, ch. 18, § I, [1952] Laws of Md. 229. 
188. Law of March 15, 1947, ch. 142, § I, [1947] Laws of Md. 209, 
189. Law of March 23, 1960, ch. 68, § I, [1960] Laws of Md. 192-93. 
190. 14w of May 6, 1966, ch. 628, § I, [1966] Laws of Md. 1125. 
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form. There would have been required until 1943 but two blank spaces. 
Into the first would go either "dwelling house" or "storehouse". Into 
the second would go either "daytime" or "nighttime." The rest of the 
count would have held constant in either situation. When after 1943. 
the storehouse variation acquired two different monetary intent levels. 
the still common indictment form was broken down into two counts-
one charging intent to steal twenty-five dollars or more (later one 
hundred dollars or more) and the other charging intent to steal less than 
twenty-five dollars (later less than one hundred dollars). Housebreaking. 
to accommodate its companion. simply assumed a superfluous intent 
distinction. 
When in 1965. housebreaking was removed from the storehouse 
breaking section and placed in with the statutory burglary section. one 
cannot realistically picture indictment draftsmen poised and anxiously 
waiting the latest legislative revision. Indictment clerks as a breed. like 
Latinists and Egyptologists. are encrusted with the patina of old tradi-
tions. Ancient forms. with their baroque phraseologies and Teutonic 
word orders. die hard. The arrangement in the code may change but the 
model indictment forms in the dusty file drawers endureth forever. A 
count. therefore. drawn in language that seems to the surface glance 
bizarre. is readily understandable. like the appendix or the vestigial 
tailbone of Man. in terms of long evolution. On behalf of my Court and 
both the advocates who stood before it that day a quadrennium ago. I 
apologize to the misunderstood indictment clerk.1 9 1 
191. Empathy for that clerk may subconsciously have been reinforced by the knowledge that 
most of the county state's attorneys' offices had copied the model indictment forms of 
Baltimore City and by the memory that the Baltimore forms had within the decade been 
extensively reviewed and revised by a triumvirate, consisting of a veteran indictment 
clerk, the unnamed State's Attorney who now sits on the Court of Appeals, and the 
unnamed Deputy State's Attorney who now sits on the Court of Special Appeals. 
